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Parsons 
Behle & 
Latimer 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111-2218 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0898 
Telephone 801 532-1234 
Facsimile 801 536-6111 
E-Mail: pbl@pblutah.com 
Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State St. 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0210 
RE: SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY SUBMISSION IN ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. V. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BD. OF EQUALIZATION ET AL., APPEAL NO. 20030612 SC 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
Plaintiff-Appellee, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Allianf) submits this letter and the 
enclosed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order in Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. 
Salt Lake County, et al, 4th Dist. Civil No. 99042607 as supplemental authority having a 
pertinent and significant bearing on the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC, pursuant to Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This rule provides in part: 
When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a 
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but 
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. . . There shall be a reference 
either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons 
for the supplemental citations. . . 
On October 1, 2004 (the same day Appellants filed their reply briefs in Appeal No. 
20030612 SC), Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Final Order in Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, et al, 4th Dist. Civil No. 
99042607. This is an "independent" action Alliant filed on February 8, 1998, seeking to 
invalidate and enjoin Salt Lake County's levy of privilege taxes on Alliant based upon the 
unapportioned, assessed value of property the United States Navy owns at the Naval Industrial 
Reserve Ordnance Plant or "NIROP" (hereinafter the "NIROP" Action). Alliant has enclosed a 
copy of Judge Davis' decision in the NIROP Action for the Court's convenience. 
Judge Davis is the same Tax Court Judge whose Findings/Conclusions Appellants in the 
present appeal, No. 20030612, have challenged. As evident from Judge Davis' Findings of Fact, 
A PROFESSIONAL 
LAW CORPORATION 
October 13, 2004 
Maxwell A. Miller 
Direct Dial 
(801) 536-6790 
E-Mail 
MMiller@pblutah.com 
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Conclusions of Law and Final Order and Judgment in the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC 
(included under Alliant's Brief at Tab B), the NIROP Action (there labeled the "independent 
action" in the caption of the Tax Court's Findings/Conclusions now on appeal) is one of the 
cases that is subject to the Settlement Agreement whose validity Appellants have challenged in 
present appeal, No. 20030612 SC. 
The Tax Court's Findings/Conclusions in the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC, describe 
the basic issues in the NIROP Action under paragraph 7, page 5. See Alliant Brief at Tab B. As 
the Tax Court explained in his Findings/Conclusions in present appeal, 20030612 SC, 'The 
Settlement Agreement [whose validity Appellants here challenge] expressly covers tax years 
1995-1999, clearly including the NIROP Action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover 
future years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued 
unlawful assessment of NIROP." Id. at paragraph 35, page 10. 
Judge Davis granted Alliant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the NIROP Action 
referenced in the Findings/Conclusions in the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC, under Tab B. 
Specifically, Judge Davis held: 
Defendants' [which include the same Defendants in the present appeal, 
No. 20030612 SC] assessment and levy of privilege taxes on Alliant for 
its use of NIROP property owned by the United States Navy for the 
years 2000 and thereafter is enjoined as a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-4-101(3)(e) and Article VI of the United States Constitution. 
Tax Court Decision at paragraph 6, page 45. 
Alliant has submitted a copy of Judge Davis' Tax Court Decision in the NIROP Action as 
supplemental authority in the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC, for the following reasons that 
pertain to Defendants-Appellants' present arguments: 
1. Defendants-Appellants in the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC, have argued that 
"THE TAX COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER O F THE [SETTLEMENT] 
AGREEMENT." See, e.g., Reply Brief of Lee Gardner at 39. Contrariwise, Alliant as the Plaintiff-
Appellee has argued, "THE TAX COURT PROPERLY HAD JURISDICTION OVER ALL YEARS COVERED 
BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT." See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Alliant at 43. 
In the NIROP Action, Judge Davis held: 
On June 30, 2003, this Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Final Order and Judgment ("Findings/Conclusions") in the six 
cases approving the Settlement Agreement [which cases are now 
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captioned under the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC]. The Defendants-
Intervenors in the 1995-1999 Valuation Cases, who are Lee Gardner, the 
Salt Lake County Assessor, and Granite School District, appealed this 
Court's Findings/Conclusions in the 1995-1999 Valuation Cases to the 
Utah Supreme Court . . . captioned [under case no.] 20030612 SC. The 
Supreme Court does not presently have jurisdiction over all six cases 
because one of them, specifically the present NIROP Action, included 
only a partial settlement under this Court's approving 
Findings/Conclusions. The remainder of the NIROP Action is pending 
before this Court. 
Tax Court Decision at 6. 
Judge Davis further held: 
This Court had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate Alliant's NIROP 
Action with respect to the years 1995-1999 subject to the Settlement 
Agreement, and now has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate Alliant's 
NIROP Action for the years 2000 and thereafter. 
Tax Court Decision at paragraph 3, page 36. 
2. Appellants Assessor and Granite have argued in the present appeal, No. 20030612 
SC, that the "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
FAILED." See, e.g., Granite Brief at 22 
In the NIROP Action, Judge Davis stated: 
On June 30, 2003, the Court entered its Findings/Conclusions approving 
the Settlement Agreement, "in its entirety" with respect to the three 
groups of cases identified above. . . However, the same 
Findings/Conclusions, which this Court also entered in the present 
NIROP Action, are not a Final Order because the Settlement Agreement 
"does not cover further years (beyond the scope of the Settlement 
Agreement) where Alliant claims continued unlawful assessment of 
NIROP." 
Tax Court Decision at paragraph 4, page 13. 
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3. Appellant Granite has argued in the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC, that the 
Tax Court erred in holding it was not bound by the Tax Commiss ion ' s decision, which declined 
to enforce the Settlement Agreement. Granite Brief at 27. 
In NIL NIROP ,V Inn , hiclfjv D .VT , I rh l -
Defendant-Intervenor Tax Commission, as a party in the N I R O P Action, 
is and was bound by all this Court ' s prior decisions, unless and until a 
Utah appellate court affirms, modifies, or reverses such decisions on 
appeal. The Tax Commiss ion ' s disregard of this Court ' s express finding 
in its December 10, 2001 Order (that Alliant operates NIROP under the 
direction and control of the United States Navy) in the Tax 
Commiss ion ' s Final Decision in Appeal No. 01-0974 (the 2000 valuation 
case), was in error and is reversed. Further, and on separate grounds, the 
Tax Commission is bound by this Cour t ' s decisions pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-601 on any petition for review in this Court by "trial 
de novo" of a Tax Commission final decision. The Tax Commiss ion ' s 
ruling in its Final Decision, Appeal No. 01-0974, which upheld the 
legality of the County ' s levy of a privilege tax against Alliant based on 
the full, assessed value of property the United States Navy owns at 
NIROP, is in error and is hereby reversed. All other issues in the 2000 
Valuation Case before this Court are reserved for fi irther proceedings, 
Tax Court Decision at paragraph 16, page 46. 
I till: .• :; NIR OF ; •t.ii > .., Ji iclge D; n i ;: fi i !:! i< n: 1 u : Id: 
Alliant appealed the Tax Commiss ion ' s Final Orders in the 1 .* '*< \ 
Valuation Cases (which included the " N I R O P issues" arising unv-iv^ L state 
law) to this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 for a "trial de novo" 
in an "independent" and "original" action. No other administrative 
remedy is possible for Alliant. . . 
rl"::\ r .u i* ' !)•-,•; • i; •: paragraph \n r-aec 12. 
4 Appellants Assessor and Granite in the present appeal, No. 20030612 SC, have 
argued, respectively, that the Settlement Agreement is unlawful because "there has been no 
showing that A T K ' s property taxes were illegally or erroneously assessed," and that the 
Settlement Agreement is unsupported by evidence. Assessor Brief at 22; Granite Brief at ! (>. 
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Judge Davis specifically addressed the impact of his decision in the NIROP Action on the 
present appeal, stating: 
In addition, this Court has expressed a deep concern of how this decision 
would affect the present appeal at the Utah Supreme Court. If, for 
example, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
[which he did], then, potentially, the Plaintiffs could argue before the 
Utah Supreme Court that the Settlement Agreement is valid, and that the 
County Commission/Board of Adjustment correctly foresaw and 
appreciated the potential constitutional challenges, etc. Further, if the 
"settlement case" is reversed and remanded, the valuation cases may be 
subject to the Independent Case ruling on exclusive use [against Granite 
and the Assessor precluding assessment of privilege taxes]. Again, 
without an evidentiary hearing ever being conducted, that ruling [against 
Granite and the Assessor] may be res judicata. 
Tax Court Decision, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
In summary, Alliant submits the Tax Court's Findings/Conclusions in the NIROP Action 
because Alliant believes Judge Davis' ruling and/or this Court's ruling in the present appeal, No. 
20030612, are interdependent for the reasons stated above. 
Yours sincerely, 
Maxwell A. Miller 
cc: Counsel of Record (w/o enclosures) 
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IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY AND FOURTH DISTRICT COURT UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER 
in his official capacity as SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; LARRY 
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER; 
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY 
HORIUCHI, and BRENT OVERSON, in 
their official capacities as the SALT LAKE 
COUNTY COMMISSION, and the SALT 
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants, 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
and GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND FINAL ORDER REGARDING 
THE FOLLOWING MOTIONS: 
1) Salt Lake County's Motion to Dismiss & 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
2) Alliant Techsystems, Inc.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
3) Salt Lake County & Utah State Tax 
Commission's Motion to Strike 
Portions of Ablpanalp and Kaufman 
Affidavits 
4) Alliant Techsystems Inc.'s Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Counsel (Mary Ellen Sloan) 
5) Utah State Tax Commission's Motion to 
Dismiss filed on May 1, 2000 
6) Utah State Tax Commission's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on May 1, 2000 
7) Alliant Techsystems, Inc.'s Request for 
Attorney's Fees Under a Bad Faith Theory 
8) Alliant Techsystems, Inc.'s Request for 
Attorney's Fees Under the Section 1983 
Action 
4th Dist. Civil No. 990402607 
3rd Dist. Civil No. 980901298 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
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At oral arguments conducted on April 20, 2004 the following attorneys appear on the 
record: 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
Salt Lake County 
The Utah State Tax Commission 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
Randy M. Grimshaw, Esq. 
Maxwell A. Miller, Esq. 
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq. 
Jason Rose, Esq. 
John C. McCarrey, Esq. 
Michelle Bush, Esq. 
Kelly W.Wright, Esq. 
Granite School District John E. S. Robson, Esq. 
I. 
PREFACE 
This is not a garden variety ad valorem property tax case. Notably, it is a completely 
separate independent action, but with overlapping issues common to other actions. At the outset, 
this Court cannot over-emphasize the complex procedural history in this case and the attendant 
constitutional complexities (state law questions and exhaustion requirement arguments versus 
state and federal constitutional law issues). It is a formidable task after assiduous labor, to 
establish an accurate procedural history. In addition, there are very delicate jurisdictional 
concerns because of the appeals pending before the Utah Supreme Court. Next, the Court notes 
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that the carefully crafted Amended Complaint seeks to explore and test the jurisdictional 
authority and limits of Utah's Tax Courts. Lastly, the Court must address previous rulings and 
their importance: whether they are dispositive, suggestive, collateral, helpful, or res judicata. So 
we must resort to bottom rung procedural beginnings and advance from there. 
Counsel can surely appreciate the difficulties presented in this case. Essentially, the 
Plaintiff is requesting that this Judge reach a decision, as a matter of law, that could affect 
millions of tax dollars and future tax dollars without conducting an evidentiary hearing or even 
hearing from one single witness. Such a ruling, potentially or arguably, would be res judicata as 
to all future years, and perhaps to all past years. What is at stake is a decision with enormous 
consequences. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for a court to summarily rule based upon 
affidavits, depositions, and the clear language of a controlling contract. 
In addition, this Court has expressed a deep concern of how this decision would affect the 
present appeal at the Utah Supreme Court. If, for example, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, then, potentially, the Plaintiffs could argue before the Utah Supreme 
Court that the Settlement Agreement is valid, and that the County Commission/Board of 
Adjustment correctly foresaw and appreciated the potential constitutional challenges, etc. 
Further, if the "settlement case" is reversed and remanded, the valuation cases may be subject to 
the Independent Case ruling on exclusive use. Again, without an evidentiary hearing ever being 
conducted, that ruling may be res judicata. 
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This is a most uncomfortable and somewhat disconcerting position to be in. No judge 
wants to make such a far reaching, heady decision without the benefit of hearing from a single 
witness, except through affidavit and depositional testimony. At the same time, the Defendants 
appear to rely almost exclusively on jurisdictional arguments as opposed to any disputed facts 
which would defeat summary disposition. The implications are tremendous. 
On the other hand, if the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, it would send a 
clear signal to the Utah Supreme Court that this Court believes there is an adequate remedy in 
the 2000 valuation case and that this Court rejects the multiplicity argument which may be a 
basis for a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C §1983. One could argue that the congregation of 
valuation cases, because they are on appeal, defeats the "multiplicity" logic. Of course the 
difficulty with this argument is that the County repudiated the Settlement Agreement, but now 
wishes to rely upon that repudiation to bar Plaintiffs reliance on a "multiplicity" theory. The 
Court ponders whether that is a "clean hands" defense. 
Because this Court finds that jurisdiction vests both on the state claim as well as the 
federal claim, the Court rejects the "exhaustion requirement" argument. In large measure, the 
Court has relied upon the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Order and Summary 
Judgment presented by Alliant Techsystems, Inc. But counsel will note dozens upon dozens of 
changes, which clarify this Court's position, together with non-substantive discretionary 
wordsmithing. This Court consistently maintains that it has jurisdiction in this extremely 
carefully crafted action, both under state law and under a very unique federal constitutional law 
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theory. The Court may be absolutely wrong and the Utah Supreme Court can carefully revisit 
this ruling. The Court notes that because of the unique facts and circumstances, it is clearly a 
case of first impression in Utah. 
Based on the Court's review of the record, it would seem nearly impossible to make these 
cases more complex. For reasons that will become obvious, it is a head-spinning task for clerks 
to even keep the case numbers coherent in this bundle of actions. 
II. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
In this case, Plaintiff Alliant Techsystems Inc. ("Alliant") has challenged the legality of 
Salt Lake County's levy of a privilege tax against it, based upon the entire, unapportioned 
assessed value of property the United States Navy owns at the Naval Industrial Reserve 
Ordnance Plant ("NIROP"), located within the perimeters of Alliant's Bacchus Works rocket 
manufacturing facility in Magna, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
On February 6, 1998 Alliant filed its original Complaint in the present action, commonly 
termed the "NIROP Action" or "Independent Action," and on June 17, 1999, Alliant filed an 
Amended Complaint. Some, but not all, of the issues in the NIROP Action duplicate and/or 
overlap issues either Alliant and/or the Salt Lake County Defendants (the "County") raised in 
their respective Petitions for Review by "trial de novo" of Final Orders the Utah State Tax 
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Commission ("Tax Commission") issued on Alliant's property tax assessment appeals for the 
years 1995 through 2000 inclusive (the "Valuation Cases"). 
On December 5, 2000, Alliant and "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys," entered 
into a written stipulation in settlement of six cases for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive (the 
"Settlement Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement excludes the 2000 Petition for Review 
(the "2000 Valuation Case"), but includes the present NIROP Action for the years 1995 through 
1999. Neither the NIROP Action, as it pertains to post-1999 years, nor the 2000 Valuation Case, 
are covered by the Settlement Agreement. It must be noted that the 2000 Valuation Case is the 
seventh case involving these same parties and most of the same issues. The 2000 Valuation 
Case is summarized below under the heading "(4) The 2000 Valuation Case." 
On December 15, 2000, parties to the Settlement Agreement filed a Joint Motion for 
Approval of Settlement Agreement with this Court. The six cases covered by the Settlement 
Agreement are in three unconsolidated groups that the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, sitting as a 
statewide "Tax Court Judge" for the Third Judicial District, processed under Fourth District 
Civil No. 990402607. The County drafted, approved and executed the Settlement Agreement, 
but later sought to repudiate its own agreement. However, on June 30, 2003, this Court entered 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Order and Judgment ("Findings/Conclusions") in 
the six cases approving the Settlement Agreement. The Defendants-Intervenors in the 1995-
1999 Valuation Cases, who are Lee Gardner, the Salt Lake County Assessor, and Granite School 
District, appealed this Court's Findings/Conclusions in the 1995-1999 Valuation Cases to the 
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Utah Supreme Court. As of the date hereof, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of five of the six 
cases, captioned Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and the 
Utah State Tax Commission and Lee Gardner and Granite School District, Appeal No. 
20030612 SC. The Supreme Court does not presently have jurisdiction over all six cases 
because one of them, specifically the present NIROP Action, included only a partial settlement 
under this Court's approved Findings/Conclusions. The remainder of the NIROP Action is 
pending before this Court. The six cases subject to the Settlement Agreement for 1995 through 
1999 inclusive are: 
(1) ASSESSMENT YEARS 1995 THROUGH AND INCLUDING 1999 IN THE PRESENT 
" N I R O P " ACTION, FILED IN 1998 (NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL AS OF 6/30/03) . 
Alliant filed the present NIROP Action in the Third Judicial District, although the case 
was later transferred, by random selection, to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, sitting as a 
statewide Tax Court Judge. This case is captioned Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 
Lee Gardner, Larry Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake 
County Commfn and Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, No. 980901298. 
(2) THE 1995-1996 "VALUATION CASE/ ' FILED IN 1999 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, AND THEREAFTER TRANSFERRED BY ORDER OF JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL DATED 
MARCH 14,2000, TO THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, SITTING AS A STATEWIDE "TAX 
COURT JUDGE" FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (APPEALED TO THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT). 
Prior to this Court's entry of its Findings/Conclusions dated June 30, 2003, it had 
jurisdiction in the 1995-1996 Valuation Case on respective Petitions for Review of the Tax 
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Commission's Final Order, which either Alliant filed, captioned Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake County Bd. of Equalization and The Utah State Tax Comm'n, No. 00070001, No. 
990912695, No. 000901301, or the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization filed, captioned Salt 
Lake County Bd. of Equalization v. The Utah State Tax Comm'n and Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 
No. 000901449 AA, No. 00090065 AA. 
(3) THE 1997-1999 "VALUATION CASE," FILED IN 2000 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, AND THEREAFTER TRANSFERRED TO THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, SITTING AS 
A STATEWIDE TAX COURT JUDGE FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (APPEALED TO THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT). 
Prior to this Court's entry of its Findings/Conclusions dated June 30, 2003, this Court had 
jurisdiction in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case on Alliant's Petition for Review of the Tax 
Commission's Final Order, captioned Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of 
Equalization, Lee Gardner, Granite School Dist. and the Utah State Tax Comm'n, No. 
010908307. 
(4) THE 2000 "VALUATION CASE," FILED IN 2003 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
AND THEREAFTER TRANSFERRED TO THE HONORABLE LYNN W . DAVIS, SITTING AS A 
STATEWIDE TAX COURT JUDGE FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (NOT YET SUBJECT TO 
APPEAL). 
Both Alliant and the County Board of Equalization filed respective Petitions for Review 
of the Tax Commission's Final Order in the 2000 Valuation Case, entered on July 16, 2003 in 
Tax Commission Appeal No. 01-0974. Alliant's Petition for Review was initially filed with 
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Judge Robin Reese under Third District Case No. 030816496, and the County's Petition for 
Review was initially filed with Judge Joseph Fratto under Third District Case No. 030917933. 
Over the County's objections, both Judge Reese and Judge Fratto transferred the 2000 Valuation 
Case to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, sitting as a statewide Tax Court Judge for the Third 
Judicial District, upon Alliant's argument that the 2000 Valuation Case should be transferred to 
this Court because certain issues in the 2000 Valuation Case repeat and overlap certain issues in 
the present NIROP Action. 
The Court has entered various decisions, summarized below, that apply to the foregoing 
four groups of cases. These decisions were not meant to be dispositive on all of the issues 
presented in the pending motions, but they have great bearing on this Court's decisions. Under 
principles of res judicata, portions of these below-summarized decisions apply to the NIROP 
Action, the 2000 Valuation case, and may equally apply to other cases that may arise between 
the same parties over the same issues. 
1. September 19, 2001 Tax Court Decision 
On September 19, 2001, the Court entered a "Tax Court Decision" (hereinafter the 
"September 19, 2001 Decision"). In this Court's September 19, 2001 Decision, the Court 
analyzed various motions, some of which pertain to the NIROP Action, including (1) Alliant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed August 24, 1999, (2) the Tax Commission's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, filed June 1, 2000, (3) the Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss, 
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filed June 1, 2000, and (4) the County's Motion to Strike, filed March 21, 2001. In its 
September 19 Decision, the Court ruled on several matters pertinent to the present NIROP 
Action, including: 
LI "The NIROP independent action falls outside the scope of the terms and 
conditions of the Settlement Agreement [between the parties as to 1995-1999]. A 1983 civil 
rights cause of action, together with other causes of action, does not fit into the post-filing 
Settlement Agreement of these parties." Sept. 19, 2001 Decision at 24. As pointed out by the 
Plaintiffs, this ruling is significant because it is one of several instances in which the Court held 
that it had jurisdiction in the NIROP Action. If the Court had no jurisdiction in the NIROP 
Action, it could not have approved the Settlement Agreement, but, instead, would have had to 
dismiss the NIROP Action. See, e.g., Blaine Hudson Printing v. State Tax Comm'n, 870 P.2d 
291, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Without subject matter jurisdiction, the . . . agency [or court] 
lacks the power to do anything beyond dismissing the proceeding."). 
1.2. "The rejection of the Settlement Agreement by the Utah State Tax Commission 
does not exclude this Court from conducting a careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic 
rejection is not permissible by this Court." Id. at 25. This ruling is significant because, once 
again, it establishes this Court's jurisdiction in the NIROP Action, as well as the Valuation Cases 
now on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Further, the September 19, 2001 Decision is 
significant because it rejects the Tax Commission's often repeated, but just as often rejected, 
argument that Tax Commission decisions are somehow binding as "res judicata" on this Court. 
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2. June 3, 2002 Memorandum Decision 
On June 3, 2002, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision (the "June 3, 2002 
Decision"). In its June 3, 2002 Decision, the Court ruled upon various matters primarily relevant 
to the 1995-1999 Valuation Cases referenced in paragraphs (1) and (2) above. However, the 
Court also ruled on several matters relevant to the present NIROP Action, including: 
2.1. "As a result of the foregoing actions the history of the various cases described 
above now pending before this Court are all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant 
and Salt Lake County relating to property tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; 
to wit [including] the Independent or NIROP action." Id. at 22, U 13. This statement is 
significant because it confirms the Court's prior rulings that it has jurisdiction in the NIROP 
Action, irrespective of Defendants' and/or Defendants-Intervenors' various Motions to Dismiss. 
Otherwise, the Court would have had no alternative but to dismiss Alliant's Amended 
Complaint. See Blaine Hudson, supra. 
2.2. The Court describes the NIROP Action as a "statutory and constitutional 
challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction 
and control of the United States Navy." June 3, 2002 Decision at 21, ^ [ 7. The Court repeated 
this statement in several subsequent rulings. It is a proper statement as to Alliant's claims. 
Defendants expressly objected to this finding, claiming it was an "oversight." Nonetheless, the 
Court reviewed this statement in light of undisputed evidence, and expressly reaffirmed that "it 
is not an oversight, but is worthy of a revisit." Id. at 14. The Court then, for a third time, 
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reaffirmed its prior finding that Alliant operates NIROP "under the direction of the United States 
Navy." Id. 
3. May 20, 2003 Ruling 
On May 20, 2003, this Court entered a third memorandum decision, captioned "Ruling 
Respecting the Legal Effect of Bluth v. Utah State Tax Commission (Bluth II) on this Court's 
Decisions" (the "May 20, 2003 Decision"). Among other important rulings, the Court's May 20, 
2003 Decision held: 
3.1 "This court has specifically and repeatedly rejected defendants' arguments that 
this Court lacks jurisdiction." Id. at 4. "Bluth II [Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2002 UT 
91] did not overrule any of the cases Bluth I [Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT App. 
138] relied upon, but simply found them [prior Utah Supreme Court cases] inapplicable. These 
cases remain viable law." Id. at 5. The Utah Supreme Court cases that the Utah Court of 
Appeals cited and relied upon in Bluth /, which "remain viable law," include, as cited in the 
Court of Appeals' opinion, "Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commfn, 1999 UT 12, P4, 974 P.2d 
286; see also Brumley v. State Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993); Walker Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (1964) ("[The exhaustion requirement] 
does not apply when . . . the administrative officer or body [] acts without the scope of. . . its 
defined statutory authority." Bluth I at f 7. 
3.2 "The mere introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate the need for 
exhaustion of administrative remedies because the Commission's decision in the administrative 
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proceeding could avoid and moot the constitutional issues, [quoting Nebeker v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n, 2001 UT 74, f 16]. Logically, the obverse must also be true; legal issues that cannot 
be mooted or avoided are appropriately brought in an original proceeding before the District 
Court because they are the sole issues at stake or the Tax Commission lacks jurisdiction to 
decide them." Wat 6. 
3.3 "These are issues [the issues in Alliant's NIROP Action] which no conceivable Tax 
Commission ruling could moot." Id 
3.4 "Following Nebeker, it would be completely senseless, indeed impossible, to require 
exhaustion of the federal constitutional-1983 issue in NIROP when the Tax Commission has no 
jurisdiction to decide it." Id. at 7. 
3.5 "Whatever exhaustion may arguably have been required of Alliant in 1999 when 
it filed its NIROP suit no longer pertains. Since 1999, the Tax Commission has ruled in each of 
the five years, from 1995 to 1999 inclusive, the County lawfully imposed a privilege tax upon 
Alliant because, the Tax Commission apparently thought, Alliant's use of federal property was 
'exclusive' (provided one does not count the Navy's supervision and control as 'use')." Id at 7 
(emphasis added). 
3.6 "To the contrary [of the Tax Commission's arguments] the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1) provides that appeals from the Tax Commission to the District Court 
are by 'trial de novo,' statutorily defined as 'an original, independent proceeding.'" Id. at 8. 
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3.7 "The incompatibility of the Tax Commission as 'impartial adjudicator' and 
simultaneous 'advocate' is obvious.'" Id. at 9. 
4. June 30, 2003 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Order and Judgment 
On June 30, 2003, the Court entered its Findings/Conclusions approving the Settlement 
Agreement, "in its entirety" with respect to the three groups of cases identified above. The 
Findings/Conclusions are a Final Order in cases grouped as No. 2 and 3, identified above (the 
1995-1999 Valuation Cases). As noted, the Defendants-Intervenors in the Group 2 and 3 cases 
appealed the Court's Findings/Conclusions to the Utah Supreme Court where that appeal is 
pending under Appeal No. 20030612SC. However, the same Findings/Conclusions, which this 
Court also entered in the present NIROP Action, are not a Final Order because the Settlement 
Agreement "does not cover future years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where 
Alliant claims continued unlawful assessment of NIROP." June 3, 2002 Decision at 16. Among 
other important rulings, the Court's Findings of Fact in its June 30, 2003 Findings/Conclusions 
include: 
4.1 "The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's 
assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States 
Navy." Id. at H 35. 
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4.2 "The Complaint in the independent or NIROP action seeks declaratory and 
injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 
and future years." Id. (emphasis in original). 
The above-summarized decisions have already resolved some issues raised in the parties' 
motions pending in the NIROP Action and will be followed here. Before this Court in the 
NIROP Action are the following motions. 
1. The County's Motion to Dismiss filed on August 24, 1999.1 
2. The parties' respective Motions to Strike the parties' affidavits. 
3. The Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss filed on May 1, 2000. 
4. The Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 1, 2000. 
5. Alliant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on August 24, 1999. 
6. Alliant's request for attorney fees under various theories. 
On April 5, 2004, the Court invited the parties to update previously filed memoranda in 
the NIROP Action. The Court heard oral argument for the third time on motions pending in the 
NIROP Action on April 20, 2004. 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court maccept[s] the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable 
1
 This Court notes that these various motions were filed prior to Alliant's withdrawal of 
claims not exclusively related to allegedly unlawful and unconstitutional taxation of NIROP; 
claims 1, 2 and 3 of its Amended Complaint. In addition, Alliant withdrew claims involving 
violation of Equal Protection and Uniformity found in claims 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
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to [the] plaintiff[].m Pendleton v. Utah State Bar, 2000 UT 96, % 5, (quoting Cruz v. Middlekauff 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1996)). Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
Alliant's Amended Complaint effectively admit the facts as alleged and challenge the 
complainant's right to relief based on those facts. See, e.g., Hall v. Dep't ofCorr., 24 P.3d 958 
(Utah 2001). 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See, e.g., Grobich v. 
Newmed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). 
Based upon the parties' stipulations, briefs, arguments, admissions, supporting affidavits, 
supporting depositions, case updates, supplemental memoranda, arguments and re-arguments, 
the Court's prior memoranda decisions and the Court's Findings/Conclusions that have already 
been entered, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that Alliant is entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Order and 
Summary Judgment with respect to what remains of the NIROP Action. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 17, 1999, Alliant filed an Amended Complaint in the above-captioned 
NIROP Action. 
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2. The Amended Complaint pleads eight Claims for Relief: (1) "unlawful 
assessment of intangibles and personal property," (2) unconstitutional application of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-102(14)(defining "intangible property" not subject to taxation), (3) violation of 
constitutional Equal Protection and Uniformity, (4) unlawful assessment of government property 
(Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-101(3), exempting permitees on government property from privilege 
taxes when they do not have "exclusive possession"), (5) constitutional violation under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (federal cause of action against persons acting under color of state law for 
violation of constitutional rights), (6) injunction against County assessment of illegal privilege 
taxes (Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1326, vesting District Courts with jurisdiction to enjoin taxes not 
authorized by law or taxes on exempt property), (7) refund of erroneously or illegally assessed 
taxes (Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321, authorizing suits for recovery of taxes "where a taxpayer 
can point to an error of fact or law in the collection of the tax." Woodbury Amsource, Inc., v. 
Salt Lake County, 73 P.2d 362, 367 (Utah 2003)), and (8) a refund of unlawfully assessed taxes 
(Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-301 and 59-2-1327, respectively authorizing an action for recovery of 
taxes paid under protest and "deemed unlawful by the party whose property is taxed" and/or 
when "the person whose property is taxed claims the tax is unlawful."). 
3. The Amended Complaint requests a refund of taxes that the "Plaintiff paid 
[Defendants] in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 on illegally assessed property, both real and 
personal, together with appropriate interest." Amended Complaint at 7. However, the Amended 
Complaint, which was filed in 1999, expressly requests relief from "1995 to the present." 
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4. The Court's Findings/Conclusions approving the Settlement Agreement in its 
entirety, entered June 30, 2003, embrace and are intended to resolve and moot Alliant's claims 
related to the years 1995 to 1999 inclusive in its Amended Complaint, specifically including 
Claims 7 and 8, which request refunds for taxes paid in those years. 
5. Further, in open court, by stipulation of the parties and with the Court's approval, 
Alliant withdrew all claims that are not exclusively related to allegedly unlawful and 
unconstitutional taxation of NIROP, claims 1, 2 and 3 of its Amended Complaint. Alliant's 
withdrawn claims also include any alleged violation of Equal Protection and Uniformity in 
Claims 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Alliant's voluntary dismissal of these claims narrows the underlying 
issue that is the basis for and gives rise to all of Alliant's remaining claims in its Amended 
Complaint in the NIROP Action. The issue that underlies all remaining claims is whether the 
Utah Code and the United States Constitution preclude the County from levying a privilege tax 
against Alliant, if applied, so that Alliant's total liability for the privilege tax is determined by 
multiplying the property tax rate against the entire assessed value of NIROP (United States 
Navy) property, rather than Alliant's limited and beneficial interest of such property. In other 
words, Alliant's underlying claim is that the County's privilege tax, as applied, is an unlawful 
and unconstitutional assessment of government property because it is based upon the full, 
unapportioned assessed value of government property, rather than Alliant's apportioned, 
beneficial use of such property. 
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6. The Court's Findings/Conclusions approving the Settlement Agreement in its 
entirety, which was entered on June 30, 2003, embrace and are intended to resolve and moot 
Alliant's claims in the NIROP Action related to the years 1995 to 1999 inclusive, specifically 
including Claims 4, 5 and 6. However, the alleged unlawful and unconstitutional assessment and 
taxation of NIROP property in the years 2000 and thereafter remains for decision. 
7. In support of their respective motions, the County submitted the Affidavits of Ed 
Kent and Steven W. Sumsion in 1999, and the Affidavit of J. Philip Cook in April of 2004. 
Alliant submitted the Affidavits and Depositions of Kim J. Abplanalp and Robert E. Kaufman in 
1999, and the Affidavit of Warren Timothy in April of 2004. Mr. Timothy's Affidavit merely 
affirmed that the interactions and relationship between Alliant and the United States Navy at 
NIROP were the same in 2004 as Mr. Abplanalp described them in his 1999 Affidavit. Alliant 
moved to strike the County's 1999 affidavits, and the County moved to strike those portions of 
the Abplanalp Affidavit and Kaufman Affidavit that attempt to affirm Alliant did not have 
"exclusive possession" of NIROP. It is very important to note that the County did not move to 
strike any other portions of these affidavits. For reasons explained later in this opinion, portions 
of these affidavits are stricken. Nonetheless, the remaining portions of the affidavits tell a 
consistent story, which supports the Court's repeated and previous finding that "Alliant operates 
[NIROP] under the direction of the United States Navy." Findings/Conclusions, Finding of Fact 
135. 
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8. Based upon the affidavits and depositions and the Facilities Use Contract, there is 
no genuine dispute as to the following material facts about NIROP: 
8.1 NIROP is the acronym for the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant, which is 
located in Magna, Utah. NIROP is physically separated from the surrounding property at 
Alliant's Bacchus Works plant and other property in west Salt Lake County, by a chain link 
fence that identifies the NIROP property, warns trespassers to keep out and excludes the public. 
The Strategic Systems Programs ("SSP"), which is an agency within the Navy, has direct 
management responsibility for NIROP. Public access is restricted. 
8.2 Further, the Court emphasizes, that NIROP's purpose is to produce missile rocket 
motors for the Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile ("FBM") program. The Navy missile rocket motor, 
now produced in part at NIROP, is the Trident II (commonly called D-5). Navy missile rocket 
motors previously produced at NIROP included the Trident I (commonly called C-4), and Polaris 
(commonly called A-3). All of these rocket motors are or have been part of the Navy FBM 
program. 
8.3 In connection with the performance of contracts or subcontracts (or both) for the 
FBM program and as a result of arm's-length negotiations between Alliant and the SSP, Alliant 
has access to NIROP facilities under a "Facilities Use Contract." There are two substantially 
identical Alliant-Navy Facilities Use Contracts that cover the time period from 1995 to the 
present. The first Facilities Use Contract covers the period 1991 through 1996. The second 
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Facilities Use Contract covers 1997 through 2001, with supplements covering the years 
thereafter. 
8.4 Under these Facilities Use Contracts, Alliant was and is designated as a 
"Contractor." As directed by the SSP under these Facilities Use Contracts, Alliant agreed to 
"maintain, account for, and dispose of [the NIROP] facilities in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of [the] facilities use contract," which incorporate by reference certain clauses of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), 48 CFR 1 and 2. 
8.5 Under the Facilities Use Contracts, any deviation from contractual requirements 
is not authorized, unless Alliant first obtains permission from the Strategic Systems Office 
("SSO") through the Navy SSO Procuring Contracting Officer in Washington, D.C., who 
reviews deviation requests with support staff and acts upon them. This process is required for 
any non-Navy directed use or activity to be conducted by Alliant at NIROP. This restrictive use 
provision is very important. 
8.6 The United States Navy owns all real and personal property at NIROP, including 
all buildings, and most machinery and equipment. Exceptions include an Alliant-owned 
inventory storage and retrieval system and burn pans. There are approximately 156 buildings at 
NIROP, which include such buildings as the HMX Grinding and Drying Facility, the Propellant 
Storage Facility, Rocket Motor Assembly Buildings, Surge Storage, Air Conditioning Utility 
Buildings, warehouses, ovens and the NIROP Shipping Building. 
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8.7 Machinery and equipment at NIROP include such items as the HMX Grinder, the 
Power Embedment Robot, Milling Machines, Lathes, Boring and Drilling Machines and multiple 
items of testing and manufacturing equipment. 
8.8 Title to any and all improvements Alliant may erect at NIROP is vested in the 
Navy. Absent a specific agreement to the contrary, all improvements become permanent Navy 
assets. Alliant has no right to remove them, and may use them only with permission. 
8.9 The SSP maintains 14 personnel located in the Alliant administration building. 
Some of their duties include management of the NIROP facilities. 
8.10 Alliant is in frequent communication with the SSP personnel on a daily basis. 
The subject matter of such communications between Alliant and the SSP includes all aspects of 
maintenance, operation, and facility usage. 
8.11 As manager of NIROP, SSP can and does limit Alliant activity and does tell 
Alliant what it can and cannot do with government property. This includes any utilization 
request for a non-Navy-directed task, an example of which would include testing of commercial 
rocket motors. 
8.12 Possession, control, or participation at NIROP is not vested solely in Alliant, but 
is shared between Alliant, the Navy and Lockheed Martin. 
8.13 Capital improvements to NIROP, major maintenance, and repairs are paid by the 
SSP under a separate non-profit contract with Alliant, which is funded on a yearly basis, usually 
22 
between $1 million and $2 million per year. Items considered capital improvements include 
HVAC systems, roof repair/replacement, upgrades of control systems, and road repair. 
8.14 Alliant's use of NIROP property, both real and personal, for non-governmental 
purposes (meaning purposes unrelated to the SSP's missile program) are specifically limited and 
are only conducted with written Navy approval. Examples include storage and shipping of 
commercial rocket motors. See Affidavit and Deposition of Lieutenant Commander, United 
States Navy, Robert E. Kaufman; Affidavit and Deposition of Kim J. Abplanalp, Business 
Manager Alliant Techsystems Inc. 
8.15 Mr. Ed Kent's Affidavit, which the County submitted, primarily describes the 
various buildings at NIROP and their uses as a third-party appraiser would see it. None of Mr. 
Kent's descriptions are in dispute. However, the Kent Affidavit fails to focus on the ultimate 
issue, which is: Does Alliant operate NIROP under the Navy's participation, direction and 
control? In support of the Kaufman Affidavit and the Abplanalp Affidavit, Mr. Kent 
acknowledges, "NIROP is owned by the United States of America and is used by Alliant in 
connection with a subcontract to supply Trident missiles for the Navy pursuant to a 
competitively bid contract with Lockheed Martin.. ." Kent Affidavit, ^[10. 
8.16 Mr. Steven Sumsion's Affidavit, which the County also submitted, likewise 
supports the Court's prior finding that Alliant operates NIROP under the United States Navy's 
participation, direction and control. Mr. Sumsion states, "One Facilities Use Contract, (N00030-
96-E-0068), related to NIROP property states that Alliant agrees to use, maintain, account for 
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and dispose of such facilities in accordance with the terms and conditions of the facilities 
contract." Sumsion Affidavit, ^ 3. 
8.17 Consistent with the foregoing, Mr. J. Philip Cook's Affidavit, which the County 
submitted, states, "ATK's (AUiant Techsystems) use of NIROP for its for-profit business is 
pursuant to a facilities use contract with the United States Navy. The contract provides 'that the 
terms and conditions of the facilities use contract shall apply to these facilities provided to the 
contractor by Government . . . for the contractor's use in performance of contract or 
subcontracts, or both, for the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) systems. The contractor agrees to 
use, maintain, account for, and dispose of such facilities in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of this facilities use contract.'" Cook Affidavit, ^ 7. 
8.18 The Kent, Sumsion and Cook Affidavits support the Kauffman and Abplanalp 
Affidavits. Neither the Kent, nor Sumsion, nor Cook affidavits address the more specific and 
essential points made in the Kaufman Affidavit and the Abplanalp Affidavit and depositions. In 
summary, the essential points in the latter affidavits and depositions are that AUiant works with 
and under the direction of Navy personnel on a daily basis in manufacturing Navy rocket motors. 
For example, speaking for the Navy, Commander Kaufman stated, "As manager of NIROP, SSP 
[the Navy] can and does tell AUiant what it can and cannot do with government property. This 
includes any utilization for a non Navy-directed task, an example of which would include testing 
of commercial rocket motors." Kaufman Affidavit, Tf 13. Speaking for AUiant, Kim Abplanalp 
added, "The local Navy office maintains 14 personnel located on the AUiant facilities to manage 
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the aspect of the NIROP facilities and the FBM program." Abplanalp Affidavit, ^ 9. 
Importantly, as noted earlier, the County's Motion to Strike did not dispute or move to strike any 
of these or other such statements in the Kaufman Affidavit and Abplanalp Affidavit. These 
affidavits remain undisputed. 
9. Consistent with the parties' affidavits and depositions, this Court has previously 
found that Alliant operates [NIROP] under the direction and control of the United States Navy. 
Findings/Conclusions, % 35. 
10. In its Final Order in Appeal No. 97-0031 (the 1995-1996 Valuation Case), the 
Tax Commission held that a privilege tax should be levied against Alliant based upon NIROP's 
full, unapportioned assessed value. The Tax Commission wrote, "A tax is imposed on the 
possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or personal property which 
for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property is used in connection with a business 
conducted for profit. This includes property that is owned by the United States Government but 
used in connection with a business conducted for profit. Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101." The Tax 
Commission's Final Order in 97-0031 was based on a finding that Alliant conducted a business 
for profit (an undisputed fact) on NIROP property. However, the Tax Commission's Final Order 
neither addressed nor ruled upon Alliant's contention that it did not have "exclusive possession" 
of NIROP property within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101, and therefore was not 
liable for the privilege tax. Neither did the Tax Commission address the federal constitutional 
question Alliant has raised in the present action. 
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11. In its Final Order in Appeal No. 99-0190 (the 1997-1999 Valuation Case), the 
Tax Commission held that a privilege tax should be levied against Alliant based upon NIROP's 
full, unapportioned assessed value. The Tax Commission further held, "the NIROP plant is not 
exempt and is subject to the privilege tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101, et. seq. The 
NIROP property is used in connection with a business conducted for profit, and the lease and 
contract entitle Petitioner to exclusive possession of the premises." Final Order at 33. The Tax 
Commission's Final Order in 99-0190 did not address the federal constitutional question Alliant 
has raised in the present action. 
12. In its Final Order in Appeal No. 01-0974 (the 2000 Valuation Case now before 
this Court on Petitions for Review filed, respectively, by the County and Alliant), the Tax 
Commission found that the Navy "retains rights to access the facility," and that "Lockheed-
Martin, as the general contractor, still has a presence at the facility at the direction of the United 
States Navy." Final Order, Appeal 01-0974, at 27. Inconsistent with its own findings, the Tax 
Commission then held that Alliant "has the exclusive possession and enjoys the beneficial use of 
the NIROP facilities in connection with its business being conducted for profit." Id. 
13. In holding that Alliant had "exclusive possession" of NIROP in the 2000 
Valuation Case, the Tax Commission opined "this case is not unlike Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. 
Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964)" in which the Utah Supreme Court upheld a privilege tax 
against Thiokol, based upon following, specific findings of fact, which the Tax Commission then 
quotes from Thiokol: 
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13.1 'The contract with which we are concerned is written in broad terms. The import 
of its provisions is to require of Thiokol to produce the end results, and it does not specify in 
detail how the research and development shall be conducted." Final Decision, Appeal No. 01-
0974 at 27. 
13.2 "Thiokol will deal with it [government property] practically as it chooses." Id. at 
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14. The Tax Commission's analogy of the dispositive facts in Appeal No. 01-0974 
(the 2000 Valuation Case) to the dispositive facts in Thiokol is not applicable. Such an analogy 
belies the undisputed material facts recited and summarized above. The dispositive facts the 
Utah Supreme Court found in Thiokol are not analogous to, nor supported by, the undisputed 
evidence here. It is undisputed that Alliant cannot "deal with government property practically as 
it chooses," as could the plaintiff in Thiokol. In support of this Court's finding that Alliant's use 
of NIROP property is subordinate to government control, Commander Kaufman's undisputed 
testimony is explicit: "The [Navy] personnel that support operations here for the Trident II 
program are basically in a role of program management, support, technical program 
management, configuration control, engineering work orders, waiver deviation nonconformance 
issues." Kaufman Dep. at 5, In 24. Commander Kaufman's undisputed testimony further 
confirmed, "Once again, the Navy here, this is the program management officer, and we oversee 
to ensure the product, as far as it meets the technical management requirements, the 
configuration control. . ." Id at 11, In 21. Commander Kaufman acknowledged that the SSP 
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does not have "day-to-day management and direction over rocket motor production at Bacchus 
West." Significantly, however, Bacchus West is not exclusive to NIROP. Bacchus West 
includes Alliant's entire rocket manufacturing plant of which NIROP is a part. Yet of greater 
significance, Commander Kaufman further testified without dispute that the "defense 
management contract command [an instrumentality of the United States Government] is out 
there day in and day out, overseeing the actual production step by step on the rocket motors and 
doing buys and things of this nature, because they are tasked with product assurance and contract 
administration." Id. at 12, In 8. These statements Commander Kaufman made in his deposition 
were subject to cross-examination, yet have remained undisputed for nearly five years, are 
supported by all affiants, and stand directly in contrast with and contrary to the Tax 
Commission's implied finding and Final Decision in Appeal No. 01-0974 that Alliant can deal 
with the property "practically as it chooses." Thiokol is not dispositive. The Tax Commission's 
implied finding is inaccurate and unsupported by undisputed facts. 
15. The Utah State Tax Commission continued to issue decisions respecting Alliant 
during the pendency of this case on NIROP property. 
16. It is further undisputed that, at least since 1999 when Alliant filed the present 
NIROP Action, the County levied a privilege tax against Alliant based upon the full, 
unapportioned assessed value of NIROP property. For example, NIROP's assessed value for 
land and improvements at NIROP for tax year 2000 was in excess of $40 million. See Affidavit 
of J. Philip Cook, f 3. It appears to the Court, as with all years previous to 2000, and, unless 
28 
enjoined, all years subsequent to 2000, the County will simply levy its privilege tax against 
Alliant on the entire assessed value for NIROP ($40 million in 2000) rather than based upon an 
apportioned share of the assessed value theory, which allegedly represents Alliant's beneficial 
use of government property that it shares with Lockheed Martin and the United States Navy. 
17. Consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321, Alliant has, in each year since 
1999, notified the County Board that the County "had no authority to collect the tax in question, 
and that it has not right to retain the same, and hence . . . the tax be refunded [to Alliant]." See 
Nielson San Pete County, 123 P.2d 334, 338 (Utah 1912) (describing the prerequisites to what is 
now a "1321 action."). It is undisputed that Alliant has, in each year since 1999, paid the 
privilege taxes assessed against it on the full, unapportioned assessed value of NIROP property 
under protest. These notices and protests were and are annual petitions to the County Board 
claiming that the County's NIROP assessments are unlawful on federal and state grounds. 
18. In the NIROP Action, Alliant's briefs have relied upon three principal groups of 
cases, which hold that the respective counties' levy of a privilege tax (or its equivalent) against a 
federal contractor, based upon the unapportioned assessed value of federal property, is 
unconstitutional as applied. These cases are (1) United States of America v. Nye County Nevada, 
938 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991), (2) United States v. State of Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Col. 
1978), affd 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cr. 1980), affd sub nom Jefferson County v. United States, 450 
U.S. 901 (1981), and (3) United States of America v. Clark County, Indiana, 113 F.Supp.2d 1286 
(Dist. Ind. 2000) and 234 R Supp. 2d 934, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24563 (2002). The Court will 
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now address the applicable case law. The Court finds that the factual comparisons presented by 
Alliant are extremely important and are accurate. 
18.1 The facts in this NIROP Action appear to be identical in all material respects to 
Nye County, Jefferson County and Clark County as follows: 
18.2 In Nye County, the Air Force directed Arcata's operation of all government-
owned property. Id, 938 F.2d at 1040. The same government oversight is true in this case. 
Dep. of Kim Abplanalp at 24 ("They [the Navy] are at the facility as well as the Lockheed 
people, and are in here virtually 24 hours a days, the same as our people are, overseeing that 
aspect, what takes place.) ("The [Navy] personnel that support the operations here [at NIROP] 
are basically in a role of program management, support, technical program management, 
configuration control, engineering work orders, wavier deviate nonconformance issues.") Dep. 
of Robert Kaufman at 5. 
18.3 In Nye County, "Areata does not have the right to use the equipment for its own 
account or business." Id, 938 F.2d at 1040. The same fact applies here. Dep. of Kim Abplanalp 
at 7 ("They [the Navy] control and direct the work that takes place." The Navy "allows" 
Alliant's use of its property. 
18.4 In Nye County, "It [Areata] has no interest in the equipment. Its only access to the 
equipment is at the time and place and in the manner directed by the United States." Id, 938 
F.2d at 1040. Likewise here, Alliant does not own and has no interest in government property. 
See Affidavit of Robert Kaufman, K f 8, 10. 
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18.5 In Nye County, "Areata cannot exclude Air Force personnel or other contractors 
from operating or maintaining the equipment." Id, 938 F.2d at 1040. Likewise here, "as 
manager of NIROP, SSP can and does tell Alliant what it can and cannot do with government 
property. This includes any utilization request for a non-Navy-direct task, an example of which 
would include testing of commercial rockets." Kaufman Affidavit, Tf 13. 
18.6 In Nye County, "Nye County makes no attempt to segregate and tax any possessory 
interest Areata may have in the property, or Areata's beneficial use of the property. Nye County 
simply taxes Areata as if it were the owner of the property." Id. at 1041. The same is true in this 
case. Alliant is taxed on the full assessed value of NIROP property as if Alliant owned it. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-4-101(2) ("The tax imposed under this chapter is the same amount that the ad 
valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner of the property.") 
18.7 In Jefferson County, "The actual operation and direct management of the Rocky 
Flats [government] Plant have been accomplished through private companies under management 
contracts with [government agencies]." United States v. State of Colorado, 460 F. Supp. at 18. 
The same is true here. Cook Affidavit, \ 7. 
18.8 In Jefferson County, "[The government agency] has maintained a subordinate field 
office located at the plant." Id. Here, "The SSP maintains 14 personnel located in the Alliant 
administration building." Kaufman Affidavit, f 11. 
18.9 In Jefferson County, the government field office performs "administrative 
activities." Id. At NIROPa "Alliant is in frequent communication with the SSP personnel on a 
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daily basis. The subject matter of such communications between Alliant and the SSP includes 
all aspects of maintenance, operation, and facility usage." Kaufman Affidavit, f 12. 
18.10 In Jefferson County, the government provides either directly or indirectly "all of 
the funds necessary to sustain the operation of the Rocky Flats Plant under Contract 3533 and no 
funds come from Rockwell." Id. At NIROP, the government provides "between $1 million and 
$2 million per year" for maintenance. Alliant provides no funds for maintenance of government 
property. Kaufman Affidavit, % 15. 
18.11 In Jefferson County, the agreement is that "Rockwell provides the services of its 
employees in exchange for the payment of a fixed fee which is negotiated annually." Id. 
"Because Rockwell bears none of the costs, the fixed fee may be considered its profit from the 
operation." Id. At NIROP, Alliant builds rocket motors for the Navy's FBM program, for which 
it receives a fee based on a negotiated contract. See. e.g., Dep. of Kim Abplanalp at 3-5. 
18.12 In Jefferson County, the Colorado statute that the United States Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional provided that "the lessee or user thereof shall be subject to taxation in the 
same amount and to the same extent as though the lessee or user were the owner." Id. at 1187. 
The Utah statute is nearly verbatim the same. Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(2) ("The tax imposed 
under this chapter is the same amount that the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor 
or user were the owner of the property."). 
18.13 In Clark County, the United States Army contracted with ICI Americas ("ICI") to 
perform certain functions at the Indiana Army Ammunition Plant pursuant to a "Facilities Use 
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Agreement," which specified the terms and conditions under which ICI was to maintain and 
function at the plant Similarly, Alhant operates NIROP pursuant to a "Facilities Use Contract," 
which specifies the terms and conditions under which Alhant is to maintain and function at the 
plant See Affidavit of J Philip Cook at f 7 
18 14 In Clark County, the Distnct Court includes a careful analysis of the development 
of the law with respect to the taxation of federal government property The Clark County Court 
discusses United States v Allegheny, 322 US 174 (1944), United States v New Mexico, 420 
US 720 (1982), and United States v City of Detroit, 355 US 489 (1958), and other cases 
Defendants cited m that case and Defendants as well as Defendants-Intervenors m this case cite 
here to justify the County's levy of a privilege tax against Alhant on the full, unapportioned, 
assessed value of NIROP property These United States Supreme Court cases permit the 
taxation of Umted States government property under certain circumstances However, m 
distinguishing all such cases, the Clark County Court found it significant that (1) the United 
States owned all of the property at the Army plant in question and (2) ICFs access and use of the 
property was restncted to the activities allowed under its Facilities Use Agreement 234 F 
Supp 2d at 948 ("Rather, the Facilities Use Agreement is more properly characterized as an 
agreement under which ICI was given the nghts to market the facilities at the Plant, and was 
paid to maintain the Plant when and as directed by the Army ") Similarly in this case, the Umted 
States owns all of the NIROP property m question, and Alliant's access and use of the property 
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is restricted to the activities allowed under its Facilities Use Contract. See Affidavit of Robert 
Kaufman and Affidavit of Kim Abplanalp, supra. 
18.15 In Clark County, the Court distinguished other cases permitting taxation of 
federal contractors on a factual basis. Said the Court: 
In contrast, our case mirrors the holding in United States v. State of 
Colorado, 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980). There, the United States 
brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that a state-imposed 
tax on a general contractor in charge of the day-to-day operations at a 
facility to develop and produce nuclear weapons, pursuant to a 
government management contract, infringed on the immunity of the 
United States from state and local taxation in violation of the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution. The Tenth Circuit concluded 
that the contract between the United States and the private contractor did 
not allow the contractor any use of the property outside that which was 
specifically delineated in the contract. Therefore, the tax was not a tax 
on any "use" of the property, but was an unconstitutional "ad valorem 
general property tax on property owned by the United States." Id. at 
220. The same conclusion pertains here. 
Id. at 949. 
Here, as in Clark County, the Facilities Use Contract (and supplements) between the 
United States and Alliant as the private contractor does not allow Alliant any use of NIROP 
property outside that which is specifically delineated in the contract. 
All of the foregoing facts, (which were deemed relevant and material by the Ninth Circuit 
in Nye County, ultimately the United States Supreme Court in Jefferson County, and the United 
States District Court in Clark County in deciding, respectively, that Nevada's, Colorado's, and 
Indiana's levy of a privilege tax on a federal contractor in those cases was unconstitutional) are 
the same or virtually the same as the undisputed facts in this case. 
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19. The Court next turns to AUiant's claim/request for an award of attorney's fees 
because of a "bad faith" claim or "bad faith" defense. 
19.1 Rule 11 (b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to 
the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief. 
19.2 Rule 11 (c) provides for sanctions in the following language: 
Sanctions. If after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the 
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, 
law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for 
the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
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(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the 
specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision . 
19.3 U.C.A. § 78-27-56, further addresses an award of attorney's fees in the following 
language: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
19.4 The Court notes that no separate motion has been filed seeking attorney fees 
premised on a "bad faith without merit" argument. Even if counsel does file a separate 
motion for sanctions and associated attorney's fees, the motion must contain "detailed 
factual findings particularizing its conclusions...The law requires that a trial court make a 
series of specific factual findings as a predicate for concluding that [Rule 11] has been 
violated, and then must determine the appropriate sanction. The trial court's findings and 
conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an appellate court can 
36 
apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of the trial court's ruling." Griffith 
v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 258-259 (Utah 1999). 
19.5 The Court finds no bad faith and cannot find that the arguments are meritless. 
This is a case of first impression and as noted earlier, it potentially has tremendous consequences 
and involves millions of tax dollars. The Court finds that counsel have simply been seasoned 
advocates for their respective clients. This Court cannot make "detailed factual findings 
particularizing" as a predicate that Rule 11 has been violated. 
19.6 The Court finds no violation of U.R.C.P. Rule 11. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Because the Tax Commission's Final Orders in Tax Commission Appeals 97-0031, 
99-0190 and 01-0974 (the 1995-2000 Valuation Cases) are before this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-601 (vesting jurisdiction in this Court to adjudicate appeals from the Tax 
Commission as "independent" and "original" proceedings under a "trial de novo" standard), they 
have no binding effect upon this Court and are not res judicata, either for the years subject to the 
Settlement Agreement, nor for any other year. 
2. In Tax Commission Appeals 97-0031, 99-0190 and 01-0974 (the 1995-2000 Valuation 
Cases), the Tax Commission had jurisdiction to decide, and in fact did decide, Alliant's state law 
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claim, which asserts the County's levy of a privilege tax against Alliant is unlawful because 
Alliant does not have "exclusive possession" of NIROP property within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e). Although the Tax Commission had jurisdiction to decide Alliant's 
state law claim, it never had jurisdiction to decide Alliant's legal claims under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-1-301 (payment under protest filed by an action for recovery of illegally assessed taxes) 
59-1-1327 (same); 59-1-1321 (action for recovery of illegally assessed taxes), or its equitable 
claims under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 (declaratory judgment) 59-1-1326 (injunction against 
illegal taxes), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (action for declaratory relief for deprivation of constitutional 
rights under color of state law). No outcome of events before the Tax Commission could have 
mooted Alliant's claims in the NIROP Action, none of which turn on a valuation issue that the 
Tax Commission had original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide. Moreover, Alliant's claims 
for relief in the NIROP action seeking recovery of what Alliant deemed illegally assessed taxes 
paid under protest are expressly authorized under Utah statutory law, including Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-1-301, 59-1-1321, and 59-1-1327. The Tax Commission does not and never did have 
jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate such actions because, to prevail in such actions, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate, and the court must hold, that the levied tax is illegal. The Tax Commission 
has no jurisdiction to entertain and make such rulings "[I]t is not for the tax commission to 
determine questions of legality or constitutionality of legislative enactments" Shea v. State Tax 
Commission, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1941). 
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3. This Court had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate Alliant's NIROP Action with 
respect to the years 1995-1999 subject to the Settlement Agreement, and now has jurisdiction to 
entertain and adjudicate Alliant's NIROP Action for the years 2000 and thereafter. This Court 
has such jurisdiction in the NIROP Action for 1999 through 2000 and thereafter as an original 
action authorized under the statutes referenced in paragraph 2 above. Secondarily, this Court has 
jurisdiction based upon the parties' respective petitions for review of the Tax Commission's 
Final Orders in the 1999 through 2000 Valuation Cases, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601. 
All of Alliant's claims with respect to the years 1995 through 1999, including Alliant's NIROP 
claims, are moot and are dismissed, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, and in accordance 
with the Court's Findings/Conclusions entered June 30, 2003. 
4. Based upon uncontested affidavits, Alliant's Facilities Use Contracts with the SSP 
(United States Navy) are "permits" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e) 
because the SSP, by virtue of such contracts, permits Alliant's use and possession of NIROP 
property, subject to the Navy's supervision and control. It is the decision of this Court that 
Alliant is, accordingly, exempt from County privilege taxes "unless the lease, permit, or 
easement entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the premises to which the 
lease, permit, or easement relates." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e) (emphasis added). 
5. It is for the Court to decide and declare whether Alliant has "exclusive possession of 
the premises." Accordingly, provisions of the Kaufinan and Abplanalp Affidavits which intrude 
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on the Court's exclusive prerogative and purport or attempt to state inadmissable legal 
conclusions on this issue are not permitted and are not binding on the Court. 
6. "Exclusive" and "exclusive possession" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-
4-101(3)(e) should not and do not have an esoteric or eccentric meaning that is different from the 
plain and ordinary meaning of these words. The words "exclusive possession" must be 
construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Hercules v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n9; 21 P.3d 231, 232 (Utah App. 2000) ("[W]e read the words of a statute literally . . . and 
give the words their usual and accepted meaning."). The "usual" and "accepted" meaning of 
"exclusive possession" cannot be equated with "shared possession." Accordingly, "exclusive 
possession" does not mean exclusive to Alliant but for the retained interest, control, supervision, 
participation and possession of the United States Navy and/or the use, participation and 
possession of Lockheed Martin in the use of NIROP property. Rather, "exclusive possession" 
within the context of Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e) means what a reasonable person would 
understand "exclusive possession" to mean: that is, "(a) excluding or having power to exclude; 
(b) limiting or limited to possession, control, or use by a single individual or group." Webster's 
New Collegiate Dictionary, "exclusive" (1980 ed.). See also Corporation of the Episcopal 
Church v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 919 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996) (holding that any use other than an 
incidental use of property for any use other than charitable is "not exclusive"). 
7. Based upon uncontested provisions of Robert Kaufman and Kim Abplanalp, Alliant 
does not have "exclusive possession" of NIROP under its Facilities Use Contracts with the 
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United States Navy because Alliant has no power to exclude anyone from NTROP. That power 
belongs instead to the United States Navy. Furthermore, Alliant's possession, control and use of 
NIROP is controlled by, shared with, and at the direction, control and discretion of the United 
States Navy. Clearly, Alliant also shares possession, control and use of the property with 
Lockheed Martin. As emphasized earlier, the United States Navy, not Alliant, can "deal with the 
property practically as it chooses," thereby distinguishing this case from Thiokol Chemical Corp. 
v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1964) (stating that Thiokol was not exempt from the 
privilege tax because it could deal with federal property which it leased from the federal 
government "practically as it chooses."). 
8. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain Alliant's respective Claims for Relief under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-301, 59-1-1321, 59-1-1326 and 59-1-1327 based upon the express 
language in the Utah Code that authorizes taxpayers to pay under protest and/or seek recovery of 
illegally assessed taxes, and/or to enjoin future illegal assessments. 
9. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain Alliant's Claim for Relief under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 because, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Natl Private Truck 
Council v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995), Section 1983 tax cases are authorized 
in state courts when state law does not offer "an adequate legal remedy." Natl Private Truck 
Council distinguishes between "legal" remedies, such as payment of taxes under protest 
followed by a refund action, and "equitable remedies," such as injunctive and declaratory relief. 
Id. at 592. Natl Private Truck Council further suggests taxpayers may not have an adequate 
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legal remedy against unconstitutional taxation when, as in this case, (1) "there is a real risk of 
'numerous suits between the same parties, involving the same issues of law or fact[;]'" id. at n. 6 
(quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 530 (1932), and (2) state or county tax authorities 
continue to impose an unconstitutional tax. Both exceptions are met in this case because, as 
history confirms, there have been, and in all likelihood there will be, numerous lawsuits over the 
same issues that arise in Alliant's NIROP Action between the same parties. History further 
confirms that the Tax Commission in its July 13, 2003 Final Decision in the 2000 Valuation 
Case ignored this Court's prior, explicit and repeated finding in the present NIROP Action that 
Alliant operated NIROP at the direction and control of the United States Navy. History further 
confirms that the County will continue to levy an unconstitutional privilege tax upon Alliant 
based upon the full, unapportioned assessed value of NIROP property year after year unless 
Alliant secures declaratory and injunctive relief. 
10. Further, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain Alliant's Claim for Relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 because, whatever legal remedies are available to Alliant to enjoin the County 
from levying a yearly, unconstitutional privilege tax upon it, such legal remedies remain 
inadequate for at least three reasons. First, Alliant appealed the Tax Commission's Final Orders 
in the 1995 to 2000 Valuation Cases (which included the "NIROP issues" arising under state 
law) to this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 for a "trial de novo" in an "independent" 
and "original" action. No other administrative remedy is possible for Alliant. Second, for 
Section 1983 purposes, all of Alliant's legal claims provide, even if successful, retrospective 
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relief only by way of refunds on a year-by-year basis. They do not and cannot provide equitable 
relief against future unlawful assessments that evince a real risk of recurrence. Third, history 
confirms that the Tax Commission has compromised its role to Alliant's detriment. As this 
Court previously found, "The incompatibility of the Tax Commission as 'impartial adjudicator' 
and simultaneous 'advocate' is obvious.'" May 20, 2003 Ruling at 9. The Tax Commission 
chose to intervene as a party-defendant in this NIROP Action. Nonetheless, by holding that 
Alliant could deal with NIROP property practically as it chooses, contravenes and disregards this 
Court's prior finding of fact that Alliant's possession and use of NIROP was and is subject to 
government control. Hence, no further exhaustion of administrative or legal remedies is possible 
to deter what Alliant claims is the County's continuous and unlawful assessments against it. 
11. Further, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain Alliant's Claim for Relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 because the Utah Supreme Court has previously approved Section 1983 actions in 
tax cases, provided administrative remedies are exhausted. In Brumley v. Utah State Tax 
Comm % 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court dismissed a tax case brought under 
Section 1983, but only because (1) the Defendant Utah State Tax Commission enjoyed qualified 
immunity as a state instrumentality, and (2) the plaintiff sought damages by way of refunds. Id 
at 800. In this case, Alliant's Section 1983 action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, not 
damages, which are sought under state remedies. Further this Section 1983 action is against a 
county, not the state. It is well-established that a city or county is subject to Section 1983 
actions and has no immunity. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980) 
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(holding that Section 1983 was "intended to encompass municipal corporations as well as 
'natural persons.'"); Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, All S.E.2d 342 (N.C. 1996), cert 
denied [after Natl Private Truck Council] 519 U.S. 1112 (1997) (favorable ruling for the 
taxpayer in a Section 1983 lawsuit against county officials for deprivation of constitutional 
rights). 
12. Alliant's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is independent from and neither mooted nor 
controlled by this Court's ruling that Alliant does not have "exclusive possession" or control 
under its Facilities Use Contracts with the United States Navy under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-
101(3)(e). See Brumley at 799 ("The legal questions involved [in Brumley] are threshold 
questions, and their determination could not have been avoided by any turn the case might have 
taken in the Commission."). This conclusion follows because, similar to Brumley, (1) this 
Court's ruling that the County's levy of a privilege tax against Alliant is unlawful under state 
law applies only to past years in which Alliant has paid its taxes under protest, but does not, by 
itself, enjoin future levies under the same pretext; (2) Alliant's Section 1983 claim is premised 
upon a violation of the United States Constitution, not the Utah Code, for assessments the 
County has levied and will, unless enjoined, further levy under color of state law; and (3) the 
prevailing party under Section 1983 is entitled to an attorneys' fee award under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, which is not available to the prevailing party under a state law claim. 
13. Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(l)(a) imposes a privilege tax upon the "beneficial use" 
enjoyed by any permittee of otherwise exempt property such as federal property. However, Utah 
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Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e) does not provide for apportionment and assessment of the 
taxpayer's beneficial use of the property as compared to and apportioned with the use of the 
exempt property owner. In this case, Alliant has been, is, and will be assessed upon the full, 
unapportioned assessed value of NIROP property, even though its use is shared with and is at the 
direction and control of the United States Navy. 
14. The levy of a privilege taxes upon Alliant on the full, unapportioned assessed value 
of property owned by the United States Navy is indistinguishable in all material respects from 
the Nevada assessment and taxing statutory scheme the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
invalidated in United States of America v. Nye County Nevada, 938 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991) 
cert, denied 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (holding that "the tax Nye County levied on Areata [a defense 
contractor] is an ad valorem tax on property owned by the United States government . . .[and is] 
unconstitutional."), and from the Colorado assessment and taxing statutory scheme the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court invalidated in United States v. 
State of Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Col. 1978), affd 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cr. 1980), affd 
sub nom Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901 (1981). In both of these cases, neither 
Nevada nor Colorado made any "effort to separate the Government's ownership interest from 
Rockwell's [or the taxpayer's] beneficial use of the property at Rocky Flats [or the government 
plant]. The Jefferson County Assessor simply applied the statutory assumption that the value to 
the contract was identical with the value to the owner." 460 F. Supp. at 1185. The same 
constitutional defect applies here because the Utah privilege tax statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-
45 
101 is an "all or nothing" statute as were the Nevada and Colorado statutes that were held 
unconstitutional. The Utah statute does not permit apportionment of privilege taxes according to 
the taxpayer's use of government property as compared to the government's use. 
15. As the prevailing party in its action to enjoin the assessment of NIROP property for 
the years 2000 and thereafter, Alliant is entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a 
declaratory order under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1331(1), an injunction under Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-1326 for future levies of a privilege tax on Alliant for its use of NIROP property, and a 
refund of privilege taxes Alliant paid on the assessment of NIROP property under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-2-301, 59-1-1327 and 59-1-1321 for the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, together 
with appropriate interest on the same from the date of payment. 
16. Defendant-Intervenor Tax Commission, as a party in the NIROP Action, is and 
was bound by all this Court's prior decisions, unless and until a Utah appellate court affirms, 
modifies, or reverses such decisions on appeal. The Tax Commission's disregard of this Court's 
express finding in its December 10, 2001 Order (that Alliant operates NIROP under the direction 
and control of the United States Navy) in the Tax Commission's Final Decision in Appeal No. 
01-0974 (the 2000 Valuation Case), was in error and is reversed. Further, and on separate 
grounds, the Tax Commission is bound by this Court's decisions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-601 on any petition for review in this Court by "trial de novo" of a Tax Commission final 
decision. The Tax Commission's ruling in its Final Decision, Appeal No. 01-0974, which 
upheld the legality of the County's levy of a privilege tax against Alliant based on the full, 
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assessed value of property the United States Navy owns at NIROP, is in error and is hereby 
reversed. All other issues in the 2000 Valuation Case before this Court are reserved for further 
proceedings. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
1. Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment are 
denied. 
2. The parties' respective Motions to Strike are granted. 
3. Intervenor, the Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Dismiss are denied. 
4. Alliant's Amended Complaint is dismissed as moot with respect to all claims from 
1995 to 1999 inclusive, in accordance with the Court's Findings/Conclusions entered in this 
action on June 30, 2002. Further, Alliant's Claims 1 through 3 inclusive, are dismissed, as are 
Alliant's claims asserting an Equal Protection and/or Uniformity violation of the United States 
and/or Utah Constitutions. 
5. Alliant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (effectively Summary Judgment since 
all remaining claims are dismissed) is granted with respect to Claims 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of its 
Amended Complaint (except the dismissed Equal Protection and/or Uniformity claim) for tax 
year 2000 and thereafter. For the reasons hereinbefore stated, Defendants' assessment and levy 
of privilege taxes on Alliant for its use of NIROP property owned by the United States Navy for 
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the years 2000 and thereafter is enjoined as a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e) and 
Article VI of the United States Constitution. 
6. Defendants and their successors in office are hereby enjoined from assessing and 
levying a privilege tax upon Alliant for its use of NIROP property owned by the United States 
Navy for the years 2000 and thereafter, unless there is a material change in circumstances 
whereby Alliant can "deal with the property practically as it chooses," without the supervision, 
control, participation or management of the United States Navy thus giving Alliant "exclusive 
possession" of NIROP property; or unless the Utah privilege tax statute is amended to permit 
apportionment of privilege taxes (and the same are apportioned) similar to the offending Nevada 
statute in Nye County. 
7. Judgment is entered against Defendants for all privilege taxes Alliant paid to 
Defendants for the years 2000 and thereafter, together with appropriate interest from the date of 
payment. Defendants and their successors in office are hereby ordered to refund all privilege 
taxes Alliant has paid on the County's assessment of NIROP property owned by the United 
States Navy for the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, together with appropriate interest from the 
date of payment. 
8. Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees based upon a U.R.C.P. Rule 
11, "bad faith without merit" theory. But Alliant has prevailed on its claim for relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Accordingly, the Court awards attorney's fees premised upon a 
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violation of the United States Constitution, but not the Utah Code claim. The defendants are 
ordered to pay Alliant's attorneys' fees to prosecute this action as determined by the Court from 
an Affidavit which the Plaintiffs attorney is directed to submit. 
DATED this _/ day of October, 2004 
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